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8 de setembro de 2013
28 de agosto de 2013
14 de agosto de 2013
17 de julho de 2013
philosophy@Lisbon nº3
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12 de julho de 2013
International Lisbon Conference on Philosophy and Film
International Lisbon Conference on Philosophy and Film
7-10 May of 2014
CFUL - Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
Hosted by the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon and the GoetheInstitut Lisbon
During the last two decades film has been increasingly recognized as a medium of philosophical reflection, in an ontological and epistemological perspective. But what does it mean to understand film as philosophizing? Can we access specific, reliable knowledge of the world and our relation to it through the aesthetic form of moving images? Considering film’s claim of continuity with the world - what is the essence of film and what is exactly its connection with reality?
Usually time and space are considered the essential constituents of film – yet they are as well our ontic and ontological condition to understand reality. In this context classical film theory and its philosophical development (Kracauer, Benjamin, Bazin, Cavell, and Deleuze) are reassessed with transcendental and speculative questions. Benjamin, for example, has pointed out how through the invention of film reality has lost its status of uniqueness and authenticity. What are the consequences of the implicit assertion to face the world as a contingent possibility out of many? And what about the ‘Myth of total cinema’ evoked by Bazin – the perfect artistic creation of a virtual world that conflates with reality? Space-time is the way, how we structure the world and orient ourselves in it. Different philosophers have been dealing with the aporia of time and approached its apparent negativity in distinct ways. For all of them the question about time implies a question about space and being, or, in other words, requires a reflection on the relation of motion and matter.
Film also evokes the phantasmagorical presence of something, which is absent, an immaterial after-death reality. In this sense, Barthes defined the photographed moment as an anticipation of the instant of the death of the objects and subjects depicted. The film negative is assembled out of 24 static frames per second—applied to Barthes’ theory that would be 24 instances of death. The immediate succession of the next frame creates than an apparent continuity. We can therefore only indirectly assist a stepping-beyond of natural time into death, at each frame. The disclosure of death in film is obscured by moving the images, creating an illusion of life. Bergson understood the illusionary mechanism of film as a paradox metaphor for the usual relation of mind and reality: that which is moving is made graspable through its opposite. For Heidegger the continuity of time is bound by the nexus of life (Lebenszusammenhang) given by Dasein. Connecting life and film, Deleuze raised the question of the world literally to be film, similar to Pasolini who claimed life as cinema in nature. Is being-in-the-world a being-in-film?
Another line of enquiry could be designated as the fascination with the reality effect, opening up a threefold domain: the ‘hypperreal’ vertigo pursued by technical constructions of the filmic realm and of spectatorship, such as 3D movies, digital camera and computer-generated images; the Lacanian distinction between reality and the Real, instrumental in Žižek’s theorizing of film; the paradoxical technical construction of a kind of image corresponding to a seeming natural perception in some ‘realistic’ cinema such as the works of the Portuguese filmmakers João Canijo or Pedro Costa, among others.
For general enquiries please contact filmtimereality@gmail.com
Fenomenologia e Ontologia. No Centenário de Ideen, de Edmund Husserl
FENOMENOLOGIA E ONTOLOGIA. NO CENTENÁRIO DE IDEEN, DE EDMUND HUSSERLDias 21 e 22 de Outubro de 2013Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de LisboaAnfiteatro IIIEntrada livreOrganização de:Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa: Grupo de Pensamento FenomenológicoResponsável: Pedro M. S. AlvesOradores convidados:Javier san Martín – UNED, Madrid, CFLU, LisboaCarmen López – UNIED, MadridJesús Diaz – UNED, MadridDenis Fisette – UNIV. QUÉBEC, MontréalFrançois de Gandt – UNIV. LILLE III, LilleJean-Pierre Renaudi – INST. FILOSOFIA, Porto, CFLUL, LisboaEmanuele Mariani – CFLUL, CEFI, IFPJairo Silva – UNIV. SÃO PAULO, S. PauloCarlos Alberto Moura – UNIV. SÃO PAULO, S. PauloPedro Alves – FLUL, CFUL, LisboaMafalda Blanc – FLUL, CFUL, LisboaCarlos Morujão – UNIV. CATÓLICA, CEFI, LisboaAna Sousa – UNIV. LUSÓFONA, CFUL, LisboaIrene Borges-Duarte – UNIV- ÉVORA, IFP, ÉvoraSérgio Fernandes – CFCUL, Lisboa
28 de junho de 2013
23 de junho de 2013
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
29-31 August 2013
http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com
REGISTRATION NOW OPEN
Registration is free, but if you're intending to attend, please do register (see below).
Invited speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)
Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s College London)
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)
Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)
Anand Vaidya (San José State University).
Confirmed accepted contributions:
Alexandre Billon (Université Lille-III)
Ottavio Bueno (University of Miami) and Scott Shalkowski (University of Leeds)
Bob Fischer (Texas State University-San Marcos)
Dusko Prelevic (University of Belgrade)
Registration:
By sending an email to EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com.
Please include ‘registration’ in the subject, and let us know your name and affiliation (if applicable) in the mail's body.
Organizers:
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).
11 de junho de 2013
Prémio Prof. Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves
para alunos do 1.º ciclo/ cursos de
licenciatura
Regulamento
Artigo 1 (Objecto)
O Prémio Prof.
Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves é instituído anualmente pela Revista Philosophica e tem como objectivos a
promoção e o reconhecimento do trabalho de estudantes do 1º ciclo que se
debrucem sobre temáticas filosóficas ou que abordem filosoficamente temas de
qualquer outra área disciplinar.
Artigo 2 (Condições de admissão)
Podem concorrer
ao Prémio os alunos inscritos num dos cursos de licenciatura da Faculdade de
Letras da Universidade de Lisboa.
Artigo 3 (Prémio)
O Prémio
consiste na publicação do trabalho premiado no número de Novembro da Revista Philosophica. O autor do trabalho premiado
terá ainda direito a uma colecção de livros do Centro de Filosofia da
Universidade de Lisboa.
Artigo 4 (Características dos trabalhos)
Os trabalhos a
concurso deverão ter sido aprovados numa qualquer disciplina dos cursos de 1º
ciclo da FLUL e deverão obedecer às seguintes especificações:
a)
versar sobre uma temática de cariz filosófico ou apresentar uma abordagem
filosófica relativamente a um assunto de qualquer outra área disciplinar;
b)
ter um máximo de 15 páginas A4, redigidas com fonte Times New Roman, tamanho 12
e espaçamento 1,5 de entrelinha;
c)
ser enviados em formato Word ou PDF, sem qualquer elemento de identificação do
seu autor nas páginas do texto.
Artigo 5 (Prazo e modo de submissão dos
trabalhos)
a) Os trabalhos
deverão ser enviados até ao dia 15 de Julho de cada ano lectivo, para o
seguinte endereço electrónico: philosophica@fl.ul.pt
b) O
nome do ficheiro deverá corresponder unicamente ao título do trabalho.
c) A
identificação do autor deverá ser feita no corpo da mensagem electrónica à qual
o trabalho é anexado e deverá conter o nome completo do autor; o curso que
frequenta; a disciplina na qual o trabalho foi aprovado, o nome do Professor
responsável pela disciplina e o título do trabalho enviado.
d) Os
autores serão notificados via e‑mail
da boa recepção da candidatura e dos textos relativos à mesma.
Artigo 6 (Júri)
O Júri será
constituído pelos membros do Conselho Editorial da Revista Philosophica, sendo presidido pelo seu Director.
Artigo 7 (Deliberações
do Júri)
a)
O Júri delibera com total independência e em plena liberdade de critério, por
maioria dos votos dos seus membros, cabendo, em caso de empate, ao Presidente
do Júri o voto de qualidade.
b)
O Júri atribuirá o Prémio ao trabalho concorrente que considerar de maior
mérito científico, devendo essa escolha ser devidamente fundamentada e ficar
registada em acta.
c)
A decisão do Júri é definitiva e não susceptível de apelo.
d) Os trabalhos
que não cumpram os critérios especificados no artigo 3 do presente regulamento ou
que sejam enviados fora do prazo não serão alvo de apreciação por parte do
Júri.
e) Se as obras
concorrentes não apresentarem a qualidade exigida, o Júri poderá deliberar não
atribuir o Prémio.
Artigo 8 (Disposições finais)
a) A
candidatura ao Prémio Prof. Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves implica a
aceitação do presente Regulamento.
b) Os casos
omissos serão deliberados pelo Conselho Editorial da Revista Philosophica.
c) A
aceitação do regulamento deste concurso implica a aceitação das normas de
funcionamento da revista Philosophica,
cujo regulamento geral e normas de publicação prevalecem sobre o presente
documento, excepto nas situações especificadas neste último.
Lisboa, Abril de 2013
6 de junho de 2013
Peter van Inwagen em Lisboa
LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics 2013
Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame
Lecture 1: Modes of Being and Quantification
12 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Modes of Being and Quantification. Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or sorts or “modes.” Existenz and Bestand (Meinong), for example, or existence and subsistence (Russell), or être-en-soi and être-pour-soi (Sartre), or Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz (Heidegger). But if that is the case, what is the relation between these modes and the existential (or particular) quantifier? Kris McDaniel, who is friendly to the idea of modes of being, has recently suggested that each mode of being requires its own “specific” primitive and irreducible quantificational apparatus. Suppose, for example, that the modes of being are existence and subsistence. Then McDaniel’s position implies that we must recognize two independent specific quantifiers, the “existential quantifier” and the “subsistential quantifier” (each with its specific dual, its associated “version” of the universal quantifier). These two quantifiers are not to be thought of as restricted versions of the “generic” ‘∃’ of the logic texts; ‘∃’ is rather to be regarded as a “derived” abstraction, a “mere disjunction” of the existential and subsistential quantifiers. But McDaniel’s position must somehow come to terms with the fact that quantifiers of both sorts may occur in the same statement and a fortiori in the same argument. (Consider an argument whose premises and conclusion involve quantification over both mathematicians—who exist—and mathematical problems—which subsist.) This paper explores the following question: What rules of inference govern the formal validity of such “mixed” arguments? Various answers to this question are considered, none of which seems to be satisfactory. It is suggested that the absence of a satisfactory solution to this “problem of mixed inferences” casts doubt on the idea of modes of being.
Lecture 2: Dispensing with Ontological Levels
14 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration. The following concepts are very closely related and perhaps even interdefinable: “ontological level”; “ontologically more/less fundamental than”; “ontologically grounded in”; “ontological status.” Have these concepts a place in metaphysics? It is suggested in this paper that there is a Bad Way to approach this question and a Good Way. The Bad Way is to propose examples of things to which these concepts are alleged to apply. (E.g., the unit set of Socrates is on a lower ontological level than, is ontologically less fundamental than, is ontologically grounded in, and does not enjoy the special ontological status of, Socrates.) The Good Way is to consider both well-worked-out metaphysical systems that make use of these concepts and well-worked-out systems that do not, and (assuming that there are systems of both sorts) to ask whether, in general, the better systems employ these concepts or the better systems eschew them. Before any such comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have the competing systems on the table. This paper is intended only to accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking—to put one metaphysical system on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact that there is no place in it for the concept “ontological level” (etc.) into sharp focus.
Lecture 1: Modes of Being and Quantification
12 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Modes of Being and Quantification. Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or sorts or “modes.” Existenz and Bestand (Meinong), for example, or existence and subsistence (Russell), or être-en-soi and être-pour-soi (Sartre), or Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz (Heidegger). But if that is the case, what is the relation between these modes and the existential (or particular) quantifier? Kris McDaniel, who is friendly to the idea of modes of being, has recently suggested that each mode of being requires its own “specific” primitive and irreducible quantificational apparatus. Suppose, for example, that the modes of being are existence and subsistence. Then McDaniel’s position implies that we must recognize two independent specific quantifiers, the “existential quantifier” and the “subsistential quantifier” (each with its specific dual, its associated “version” of the universal quantifier). These two quantifiers are not to be thought of as restricted versions of the “generic” ‘∃’ of the logic texts; ‘∃’ is rather to be regarded as a “derived” abstraction, a “mere disjunction” of the existential and subsistential quantifiers. But McDaniel’s position must somehow come to terms with the fact that quantifiers of both sorts may occur in the same statement and a fortiori in the same argument. (Consider an argument whose premises and conclusion involve quantification over both mathematicians—who exist—and mathematical problems—which subsist.) This paper explores the following question: What rules of inference govern the formal validity of such “mixed” arguments? Various answers to this question are considered, none of which seems to be satisfactory. It is suggested that the absence of a satisfactory solution to this “problem of mixed inferences” casts doubt on the idea of modes of being.
Lecture 2: Dispensing with Ontological Levels
14 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration. The following concepts are very closely related and perhaps even interdefinable: “ontological level”; “ontologically more/less fundamental than”; “ontologically grounded in”; “ontological status.” Have these concepts a place in metaphysics? It is suggested in this paper that there is a Bad Way to approach this question and a Good Way. The Bad Way is to propose examples of things to which these concepts are alleged to apply. (E.g., the unit set of Socrates is on a lower ontological level than, is ontologically less fundamental than, is ontologically grounded in, and does not enjoy the special ontological status of, Socrates.) The Good Way is to consider both well-worked-out metaphysical systems that make use of these concepts and well-worked-out systems that do not, and (assuming that there are systems of both sorts) to ask whether, in general, the better systems employ these concepts or the better systems eschew them. Before any such comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have the competing systems on the table. This paper is intended only to accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking—to put one metaphysical system on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact that there is no place in it for the concept “ontological level” (etc.) into sharp focus.
3 de junho de 2013
Sara Bizarro: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 14
The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
Sara Bizarro (University of Lisbon, LanCog Group)
7 de Junho de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The mental imagery debate, a debate about the nature of certain allegedly pictorial mental representations, is still undecided. On one side of the debate, we have those who argue that mental imagery is propositional in its nature, or at least a lot less pictorial than we like to think, while on the other side of the debate, we have those who defend that mental imagery is essentially pictorial in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify both positions with the examples usually brought up to illustrate them. In view of these examples, some conclusions are reached. Mental imagery is said to be not very detailed and have pictorial aspects that are similar to those that exist in regular perception. Mental imagery is also said to be cognitively permeable. Elaborate encoding across modalities is said to be more efficient than within modalities, thus supporting a dual code hypothesis of mental representation.
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
ALL WELCOME!
2012-13: Session 14
The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
Sara Bizarro (University of Lisbon, LanCog Group)
7 de Junho de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The mental imagery debate, a debate about the nature of certain allegedly pictorial mental representations, is still undecided. On one side of the debate, we have those who argue that mental imagery is propositional in its nature, or at least a lot less pictorial than we like to think, while on the other side of the debate, we have those who defend that mental imagery is essentially pictorial in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify both positions with the examples usually brought up to illustrate them. In view of these examples, some conclusions are reached. Mental imagery is said to be not very detailed and have pictorial aspects that are similar to those that exist in regular perception. Mental imagery is also said to be cognitively permeable. Elaborate encoding across modalities is said to be more efficient than within modalities, thus supporting a dual code hypothesis of mental representation.
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
ALL WELCOME!
Viriato Soromenho-Marques: "Europa Federal. Utopia ou Necessidade?"
Clique no cartaz para ler a informação em boas condições.
30 de maio de 2013
Living at the Present Moment - Fabrice Correia (Un. Neuchâtel)
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 13
Living at the Present Moment
Fabrice Correia (University of Neuchâtel)
31 de Maio de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory - two of the main theories of temporal existence which take temporal passage seriously - have recently been accused of leading to a grave epistemic issue: on either view, we cannot know that it's now now. The objection is considered by some prominent philosophers to be very powerful. I offer a precise characterisation of these views (and, in so doing, of other related views in the area like e.g. presentism), and use it to undermine the objection. The presentation is largely based on joint work with Sven Rosenkranz.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
2012-13: Session 13
Living at the Present Moment
Fabrice Correia (University of Neuchâtel)
31 de Maio de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory - two of the main theories of temporal existence which take temporal passage seriously - have recently been accused of leading to a grave epistemic issue: on either view, we cannot know that it's now now. The objection is considered by some prominent philosophers to be very powerful. I offer a precise characterisation of these views (and, in so doing, of other related views in the area like e.g. presentism), and use it to undermine the objection. The presentation is largely based on joint work with Sven Rosenkranz.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
29 de maio de 2013
Ensinar Filosofia? O que dizem os filósofos - lançamento do livro
Clique no cartaz para ler a informação em melhores condições.
13 de maio de 2013
Ontologia da Arte: Criatividade e Bom Senso
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 12
Ontologia da Arte: Criatividade e Bom Senso
António Lopes (Universidade de Lisboa, LanCog Group)
17 de Maio de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Resumo: Que tipo de coisa é Macbeth? Se dois compositores escrevem duas partituras exactamente iguais sem o saberem, quantas obras temos? Se um poeta concebe um soneto e é atropelado fatalmente antes de o escrever, existe ou existiu um poema?
Ao longo das últimas décadas, filósofos da arte e metafísicos têm apresentado perspectivas extremamente diversas, originais e surpreendentes sobre o problema de saber quais as categorias metafísicas em que melhor se encaixam as diferentes obras de arte. A profusão de teorias neste campo não só cobre a quase totalidade das categorias geralmente discutidas, como a transborda. A inovação em ontologia da arte parece querer espelhar a criatividade do seu objecto.
Traçarei uma panorâmica das principais teorias ontológicas hoje discutidas, como preparação para a discussão de algumas questões meta-ontológicas e metodológicas cada vez mais na ordem do dia. Deve uma ontologia da arte descrever as concepções metafísicas constitutivas implícitas no discurso e prática artísticos, ou regimentá-las? Poderão estar erradas as crenças fundamentais dessa prática acerca da natureza dos artefactos que cria e com os quais lida? A partir de que limites uma teoria deixa de ser revisionista para passar a falhar o objecto que devia analisar?
Como pano de fundo estará uma sugestão: se as questões de apreciação e valor têm a primazia na filosofia da arte, a metafísica em sentido estrito é esteticamente inerte, mesmo que isso não lhe retire o fascínio.
ALL WELCOME!
2012-13: Session 12
Ontologia da Arte: Criatividade e Bom Senso
António Lopes (Universidade de Lisboa, LanCog Group)
17 de Maio de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Resumo: Que tipo de coisa é Macbeth? Se dois compositores escrevem duas partituras exactamente iguais sem o saberem, quantas obras temos? Se um poeta concebe um soneto e é atropelado fatalmente antes de o escrever, existe ou existiu um poema?
Ao longo das últimas décadas, filósofos da arte e metafísicos têm apresentado perspectivas extremamente diversas, originais e surpreendentes sobre o problema de saber quais as categorias metafísicas em que melhor se encaixam as diferentes obras de arte. A profusão de teorias neste campo não só cobre a quase totalidade das categorias geralmente discutidas, como a transborda. A inovação em ontologia da arte parece querer espelhar a criatividade do seu objecto.
Traçarei uma panorâmica das principais teorias ontológicas hoje discutidas, como preparação para a discussão de algumas questões meta-ontológicas e metodológicas cada vez mais na ordem do dia. Deve uma ontologia da arte descrever as concepções metafísicas constitutivas implícitas no discurso e prática artísticos, ou regimentá-las? Poderão estar erradas as crenças fundamentais dessa prática acerca da natureza dos artefactos que cria e com os quais lida? A partir de que limites uma teoria deixa de ser revisionista para passar a falhar o objecto que devia analisar?
Como pano de fundo estará uma sugestão: se as questões de apreciação e valor têm a primazia na filosofia da arte, a metafísica em sentido estrito é esteticamente inerte, mesmo que isso não lhe retire o fascínio.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
Challenges to Participation in Democracy
Clique na imagem para ler a informação em melhores condições.
Convidamos todos os interessados a assistir e participar nas discussões. A entrada é livre e o programa pode ser consultado no site do colóquio: http://cpd2013lisbon.wordpress.com/program/
Organização: José Gomes André (CFUL) e André Santos Campos (IFL-UNL).
12 de maio de 2013
11 de maio de 2013
Sobre a Geometria e a Representação Espacial em E. Husserl
No próximo dia 13 de Maio, pelas 14 horas e 30 minutos, realiza-se na Sala Mattos Romão, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, mais uma sessão do Seminário Permanente de Fenomenologia do Grupo de Pensamento Fenomenológico do Centro de Filosofia da UL.
A exposição estará a cargo de Jairo José da Silva (São Paulo)
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