Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)
Counterfactual Abduction and the Inference to the Best Explanation
Moritz Schulz (Logos Group, University of Barcelona)
Abstract: Counterfactuals give rise to a kind of inference
(counterfactual abduction) strikingly similar to what is usually called the inference to the best explanation. On the other hand, counterfactuals seem to play a major role in inferences to the best explanation. This suggests that the two kinds of inferences could be accounted for in a unified way. I will argue that both types of inferences can be seen as a certain kind of exclusion argument which starts with a simple disjunction of hypotheses (in the case of counterfactual abduction) or with a disjunction of potential explanations (in the case of the inference to the best explanation) and then proceeds in counterfactual terms. As a result, it will turn out that both types of abduction owe their evidential import to the availability of a corresponding deductive argument. In the form of a slogan: abduction is just a special kind of deduction.
(counterfactual abduction) strikingly similar to what is usually called the inference to the best explanation. On the other hand, counterfactuals seem to play a major role in inferences to the best explanation. This suggests that the two kinds of inferences could be accounted for in a unified way. I will argue that both types of inferences can be seen as a certain kind of exclusion argument which starts with a simple disjunction of hypotheses (in the case of counterfactual abduction) or with a disjunction of potential explanations (in the case of the inference to the best explanation) and then proceeds in counterfactual terms. As a result, it will turn out that both types of abduction owe their evidential import to the availability of a corresponding deductive argument. In the form of a slogan: abduction is just a special kind of deduction.
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