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28 de junho de 2013
23 de junho de 2013
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
29-31 August 2013
http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com
REGISTRATION NOW OPEN
Registration is free, but if you're intending to attend, please do register (see below).
Invited speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)
Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s College London)
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)
Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)
Anand Vaidya (San José State University).
Confirmed accepted contributions:
Alexandre Billon (Université Lille-III)
Ottavio Bueno (University of Miami) and Scott Shalkowski (University of Leeds)
Bob Fischer (Texas State University-San Marcos)
Dusko Prelevic (University of Belgrade)
Registration:
By sending an email to EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com.
Please include ‘registration’ in the subject, and let us know your name and affiliation (if applicable) in the mail's body.
Organizers:
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).
11 de junho de 2013
Prémio Prof. Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves
para alunos do 1.º ciclo/ cursos de
licenciatura
Regulamento
Artigo 1 (Objecto)
O Prémio Prof.
Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves é instituído anualmente pela Revista Philosophica e tem como objectivos a
promoção e o reconhecimento do trabalho de estudantes do 1º ciclo que se
debrucem sobre temáticas filosóficas ou que abordem filosoficamente temas de
qualquer outra área disciplinar.
Artigo 2 (Condições de admissão)
Podem concorrer
ao Prémio os alunos inscritos num dos cursos de licenciatura da Faculdade de
Letras da Universidade de Lisboa.
Artigo 3 (Prémio)
O Prémio
consiste na publicação do trabalho premiado no número de Novembro da Revista Philosophica. O autor do trabalho premiado
terá ainda direito a uma colecção de livros do Centro de Filosofia da
Universidade de Lisboa.
Artigo 4 (Características dos trabalhos)
Os trabalhos a
concurso deverão ter sido aprovados numa qualquer disciplina dos cursos de 1º
ciclo da FLUL e deverão obedecer às seguintes especificações:
a)
versar sobre uma temática de cariz filosófico ou apresentar uma abordagem
filosófica relativamente a um assunto de qualquer outra área disciplinar;
b)
ter um máximo de 15 páginas A4, redigidas com fonte Times New Roman, tamanho 12
e espaçamento 1,5 de entrelinha;
c)
ser enviados em formato Word ou PDF, sem qualquer elemento de identificação do
seu autor nas páginas do texto.
Artigo 5 (Prazo e modo de submissão dos
trabalhos)
a) Os trabalhos
deverão ser enviados até ao dia 15 de Julho de cada ano lectivo, para o
seguinte endereço electrónico: philosophica@fl.ul.pt
b) O
nome do ficheiro deverá corresponder unicamente ao título do trabalho.
c) A
identificação do autor deverá ser feita no corpo da mensagem electrónica à qual
o trabalho é anexado e deverá conter o nome completo do autor; o curso que
frequenta; a disciplina na qual o trabalho foi aprovado, o nome do Professor
responsável pela disciplina e o título do trabalho enviado.
d) Os
autores serão notificados via e‑mail
da boa recepção da candidatura e dos textos relativos à mesma.
Artigo 6 (Júri)
O Júri será
constituído pelos membros do Conselho Editorial da Revista Philosophica, sendo presidido pelo seu Director.
Artigo 7 (Deliberações
do Júri)
a)
O Júri delibera com total independência e em plena liberdade de critério, por
maioria dos votos dos seus membros, cabendo, em caso de empate, ao Presidente
do Júri o voto de qualidade.
b)
O Júri atribuirá o Prémio ao trabalho concorrente que considerar de maior
mérito científico, devendo essa escolha ser devidamente fundamentada e ficar
registada em acta.
c)
A decisão do Júri é definitiva e não susceptível de apelo.
d) Os trabalhos
que não cumpram os critérios especificados no artigo 3 do presente regulamento ou
que sejam enviados fora do prazo não serão alvo de apreciação por parte do
Júri.
e) Se as obras
concorrentes não apresentarem a qualidade exigida, o Júri poderá deliberar não
atribuir o Prémio.
Artigo 8 (Disposições finais)
a) A
candidatura ao Prémio Prof. Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves implica a
aceitação do presente Regulamento.
b) Os casos
omissos serão deliberados pelo Conselho Editorial da Revista Philosophica.
c) A
aceitação do regulamento deste concurso implica a aceitação das normas de
funcionamento da revista Philosophica,
cujo regulamento geral e normas de publicação prevalecem sobre o presente
documento, excepto nas situações especificadas neste último.
Lisboa, Abril de 2013
6 de junho de 2013
Peter van Inwagen em Lisboa
LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics 2013
Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame
Lecture 1: Modes of Being and Quantification
12 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Modes of Being and Quantification. Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or sorts or “modes.” Existenz and Bestand (Meinong), for example, or existence and subsistence (Russell), or être-en-soi and être-pour-soi (Sartre), or Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz (Heidegger). But if that is the case, what is the relation between these modes and the existential (or particular) quantifier? Kris McDaniel, who is friendly to the idea of modes of being, has recently suggested that each mode of being requires its own “specific” primitive and irreducible quantificational apparatus. Suppose, for example, that the modes of being are existence and subsistence. Then McDaniel’s position implies that we must recognize two independent specific quantifiers, the “existential quantifier” and the “subsistential quantifier” (each with its specific dual, its associated “version” of the universal quantifier). These two quantifiers are not to be thought of as restricted versions of the “generic” ‘∃’ of the logic texts; ‘∃’ is rather to be regarded as a “derived” abstraction, a “mere disjunction” of the existential and subsistential quantifiers. But McDaniel’s position must somehow come to terms with the fact that quantifiers of both sorts may occur in the same statement and a fortiori in the same argument. (Consider an argument whose premises and conclusion involve quantification over both mathematicians—who exist—and mathematical problems—which subsist.) This paper explores the following question: What rules of inference govern the formal validity of such “mixed” arguments? Various answers to this question are considered, none of which seems to be satisfactory. It is suggested that the absence of a satisfactory solution to this “problem of mixed inferences” casts doubt on the idea of modes of being.
Lecture 2: Dispensing with Ontological Levels
14 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration. The following concepts are very closely related and perhaps even interdefinable: “ontological level”; “ontologically more/less fundamental than”; “ontologically grounded in”; “ontological status.” Have these concepts a place in metaphysics? It is suggested in this paper that there is a Bad Way to approach this question and a Good Way. The Bad Way is to propose examples of things to which these concepts are alleged to apply. (E.g., the unit set of Socrates is on a lower ontological level than, is ontologically less fundamental than, is ontologically grounded in, and does not enjoy the special ontological status of, Socrates.) The Good Way is to consider both well-worked-out metaphysical systems that make use of these concepts and well-worked-out systems that do not, and (assuming that there are systems of both sorts) to ask whether, in general, the better systems employ these concepts or the better systems eschew them. Before any such comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have the competing systems on the table. This paper is intended only to accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking—to put one metaphysical system on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact that there is no place in it for the concept “ontological level” (etc.) into sharp focus.
Lecture 1: Modes of Being and Quantification
12 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Modes of Being and Quantification. Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or sorts or “modes.” Existenz and Bestand (Meinong), for example, or existence and subsistence (Russell), or être-en-soi and être-pour-soi (Sartre), or Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz (Heidegger). But if that is the case, what is the relation between these modes and the existential (or particular) quantifier? Kris McDaniel, who is friendly to the idea of modes of being, has recently suggested that each mode of being requires its own “specific” primitive and irreducible quantificational apparatus. Suppose, for example, that the modes of being are existence and subsistence. Then McDaniel’s position implies that we must recognize two independent specific quantifiers, the “existential quantifier” and the “subsistential quantifier” (each with its specific dual, its associated “version” of the universal quantifier). These two quantifiers are not to be thought of as restricted versions of the “generic” ‘∃’ of the logic texts; ‘∃’ is rather to be regarded as a “derived” abstraction, a “mere disjunction” of the existential and subsistential quantifiers. But McDaniel’s position must somehow come to terms with the fact that quantifiers of both sorts may occur in the same statement and a fortiori in the same argument. (Consider an argument whose premises and conclusion involve quantification over both mathematicians—who exist—and mathematical problems—which subsist.) This paper explores the following question: What rules of inference govern the formal validity of such “mixed” arguments? Various answers to this question are considered, none of which seems to be satisfactory. It is suggested that the absence of a satisfactory solution to this “problem of mixed inferences” casts doubt on the idea of modes of being.
Lecture 2: Dispensing with Ontological Levels
14 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration. The following concepts are very closely related and perhaps even interdefinable: “ontological level”; “ontologically more/less fundamental than”; “ontologically grounded in”; “ontological status.” Have these concepts a place in metaphysics? It is suggested in this paper that there is a Bad Way to approach this question and a Good Way. The Bad Way is to propose examples of things to which these concepts are alleged to apply. (E.g., the unit set of Socrates is on a lower ontological level than, is ontologically less fundamental than, is ontologically grounded in, and does not enjoy the special ontological status of, Socrates.) The Good Way is to consider both well-worked-out metaphysical systems that make use of these concepts and well-worked-out systems that do not, and (assuming that there are systems of both sorts) to ask whether, in general, the better systems employ these concepts or the better systems eschew them. Before any such comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have the competing systems on the table. This paper is intended only to accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking—to put one metaphysical system on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact that there is no place in it for the concept “ontological level” (etc.) into sharp focus.
3 de junho de 2013
Sara Bizarro: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 14
The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
Sara Bizarro (University of Lisbon, LanCog Group)
7 de Junho de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The mental imagery debate, a debate about the nature of certain allegedly pictorial mental representations, is still undecided. On one side of the debate, we have those who argue that mental imagery is propositional in its nature, or at least a lot less pictorial than we like to think, while on the other side of the debate, we have those who defend that mental imagery is essentially pictorial in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify both positions with the examples usually brought up to illustrate them. In view of these examples, some conclusions are reached. Mental imagery is said to be not very detailed and have pictorial aspects that are similar to those that exist in regular perception. Mental imagery is also said to be cognitively permeable. Elaborate encoding across modalities is said to be more efficient than within modalities, thus supporting a dual code hypothesis of mental representation.
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
ALL WELCOME!
2012-13: Session 14
The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
Sara Bizarro (University of Lisbon, LanCog Group)
7 de Junho de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The mental imagery debate, a debate about the nature of certain allegedly pictorial mental representations, is still undecided. On one side of the debate, we have those who argue that mental imagery is propositional in its nature, or at least a lot less pictorial than we like to think, while on the other side of the debate, we have those who defend that mental imagery is essentially pictorial in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify both positions with the examples usually brought up to illustrate them. In view of these examples, some conclusions are reached. Mental imagery is said to be not very detailed and have pictorial aspects that are similar to those that exist in regular perception. Mental imagery is also said to be cognitively permeable. Elaborate encoding across modalities is said to be more efficient than within modalities, thus supporting a dual code hypothesis of mental representation.
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
ALL WELCOME!
Viriato Soromenho-Marques: "Europa Federal. Utopia ou Necessidade?"
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