Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
LANCOG SEMINAR
2013-14: Session 14
Existe, para cada Pensamento, uma e uma só análise?
José Manuel Mestre
University of Lisbon
6 de Junho de 2014, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Resumo: Em várias ocasiões, Frege exprime-se em termos que sugerem a adopção de dois modelos aparentemente incompatíveis de análise do Pensamento: o modelo “parte-todo” e o modelo “função-argumento”. A interpretação de Michael Dummett favorece o primeiro; a de Peter Geach o segundo. De acordo com Dummett, apenas a adopção do modelo “parte-todo” implica que exista, para cada Pensamento, uma e uma só análise.
Nesta comunicação, defendemos a interpretação de Geach, a partir da discussão dos casos relevantes de identidade de Pensamentos considerados por Frege. Em particular, a propósito da identidade entre Pensamentos que envolvem sentidos de relações inversas não simétricas, tentamos responder a uma defesa do ponto de vista de Dummett apresentada por Peter Sullivan.
ALL WELCOME!
--
LanCog Research Group
www.lancog.com
Centro de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Epistemologia. Mostrar todas as mensagens
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5 de junho de 2014
26 de maio de 2014
11 de maio de 2014
On the concept-conception distinction - Elisabetta Lalumera
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2013-14: Session 6
On the concept-conception distinction
Elisabetta Lalumera
University of Milano-Bicocca
16 May 2014, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: ‘Concept’ is a theoretical term in both philosophical and psychological theories. Some authors have put into question the existence of concepts as natural kinds, with homogeneous properties out there to be explained (Machery 2009, Malt 2010). Many others, however, concede the point but claim that concepts are part of the explanans in cognitive science and philosophy, their function being to enable us to describe and give accounts of phenomena such as language understanding, inference, categorization, decision-making and deliberation (Weiskopf 2010, Lalumera 2010, Hampton 2010). According to these authors there are phenomena that we would not be able to explain adequately without the notion of concept.
In line with this broad view, this is a conservative paper. My aim here is to defend the view that, far from being theoretically idle, the notion of concept should be supplemented by a more thorough understanding of the concept-conception distinction. In fact, the notion of concept is not fine-grained enough in some explanatory contexts. I claim that phenomena such as genuine disagreement and concept contestation can be better described in terms of both concepts and conceptions, and would otherwise remain implausibly puzzling.
Intuitively, conceptions stand to concepts as do many to one, and conceptions can be wrong, and get corrected. Though familiar, however, the concept-conception distinction is rarely focused on. Some material can be found in the debate in political philosophy, in the discussion following John Rawls, and Richard Dworkin’s work (Rawls 1999, Dworkin 1988). In the philosophy of mind and psychology Susan Carey (2009), Ruth Millikan (2000), Georges Rey (1985, 2010), and less recently Christopher Peacocke (1992, 1998) wrote about the two notions. In what follows I will individuate two different ways to draw the concept-conception distinction (sections 2 and 3), and confront them vis-à-vis the explanatory desiderata posed by cases of genuine disagreement, and concept contestation, which I present in the fourth section, drawing on well-known examples by Tyler Burge , and Timothy Williamson. Finally I discuss the notion of essentially contested concept, introduced by W. B. Gallie (1956).
One clarification before starting. Some philosophers of psychology think that the notion of concept is ambiguous between the philosophical and the psychological usage. Supporters of the ambiguity view point to the fact that concepts for philosophers are abstract objects, while concepts for psychologists are mental particulars (Margolis and Laurence 2007); that philosophers are concerned with the semantics of concepts while psychologists are not (Machery 2009); that – in a similar vein – concepts for philosophers determine their extensions, while concept for psychologists do not, or they determine a different extension (Margolis and Laurence 2007); and finally, that philosophers narrow the scope of conceptual capacities to rational deliberation and language understanding only, whereas psychologists broaden it (Machery 2009). In this paper I do not provide arguments against the ambiguity view, but I assume the rival position, namely the view that ‘concept’ is a polysemous word, whose philosophical and psychological meaning are related. One way to relate them is to agree that concepts constitute a functional kind posited to explain some traits of human behaviour, as I said above (Weiskopf 2010, Lalumera 2010), and that (typical) psychological theories and (typical) philosophical theories of concepts diverge on the agenda of what has to be explained and in what order (Carey 2009). I will suggest that conceptions may deserve the same status.
References
Burge, T. (2009) Intellectual norms and the foundations of mind. Foundations of Mind, Oxford: OUP.
Carey, S. (2009) The origins of concepts. Oxford: OUP.
Criley, M. E. (2007). Contested concepts and competing conceptions. ProQuest.
Dworkin, R. (1988). Law's Empire. Harvard, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
Ericsson, K. A., Charness, P., Feltovich, J. E Hoffman, R. (a cura di) (2006). The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gallie , W. B. (1956) Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, 167-98.
Gelman, S. A. (2005). Psychological Science Agenda: May 2005. Psychological Science.
Goldman, (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 85-110.
Hampton, J. A. (2010). Concept talk cannot be avoided. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 212-213.
Lakoff, George. 2006a. Thinking points: Communicating our American values and vision : a progressive’s handbook. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 217-218.
Machery, E. (2009). Doing without concepts (p. 210). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2007). The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations? 1. Noûs, 41(4), 561-593.
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning, pp. 179-195, Cambridge.
Millikan, R. (2005). Language: a Biological Model, Oxford: OUP.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. The MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1998). Implicit conceptions, understanding and rationality. Philosophical issues, 43-88.
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1999
Rey, G. (1985) Concepts and conceptions: A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips. Cognition 19:297–303.
Rey, G. (2010). Concepts versus conceptions (again). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 221-222.
Selinger, E. e Crease, R. (eds.) (2006). The Philosophy of Expertise. New York: Columbia University Press.
Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell
ALL WELCOME!
--
LanCog Research Group
www.lancog.com
Centro de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2013-14: Session 6
On the concept-conception distinction
Elisabetta Lalumera
University of Milano-Bicocca
16 May 2014, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: ‘Concept’ is a theoretical term in both philosophical and psychological theories. Some authors have put into question the existence of concepts as natural kinds, with homogeneous properties out there to be explained (Machery 2009, Malt 2010). Many others, however, concede the point but claim that concepts are part of the explanans in cognitive science and philosophy, their function being to enable us to describe and give accounts of phenomena such as language understanding, inference, categorization, decision-making and deliberation (Weiskopf 2010, Lalumera 2010, Hampton 2010). According to these authors there are phenomena that we would not be able to explain adequately without the notion of concept.
In line with this broad view, this is a conservative paper. My aim here is to defend the view that, far from being theoretically idle, the notion of concept should be supplemented by a more thorough understanding of the concept-conception distinction. In fact, the notion of concept is not fine-grained enough in some explanatory contexts. I claim that phenomena such as genuine disagreement and concept contestation can be better described in terms of both concepts and conceptions, and would otherwise remain implausibly puzzling.
Intuitively, conceptions stand to concepts as do many to one, and conceptions can be wrong, and get corrected. Though familiar, however, the concept-conception distinction is rarely focused on. Some material can be found in the debate in political philosophy, in the discussion following John Rawls, and Richard Dworkin’s work (Rawls 1999, Dworkin 1988). In the philosophy of mind and psychology Susan Carey (2009), Ruth Millikan (2000), Georges Rey (1985, 2010), and less recently Christopher Peacocke (1992, 1998) wrote about the two notions. In what follows I will individuate two different ways to draw the concept-conception distinction (sections 2 and 3), and confront them vis-à-vis the explanatory desiderata posed by cases of genuine disagreement, and concept contestation, which I present in the fourth section, drawing on well-known examples by Tyler Burge , and Timothy Williamson. Finally I discuss the notion of essentially contested concept, introduced by W. B. Gallie (1956).
One clarification before starting. Some philosophers of psychology think that the notion of concept is ambiguous between the philosophical and the psychological usage. Supporters of the ambiguity view point to the fact that concepts for philosophers are abstract objects, while concepts for psychologists are mental particulars (Margolis and Laurence 2007); that philosophers are concerned with the semantics of concepts while psychologists are not (Machery 2009); that – in a similar vein – concepts for philosophers determine their extensions, while concept for psychologists do not, or they determine a different extension (Margolis and Laurence 2007); and finally, that philosophers narrow the scope of conceptual capacities to rational deliberation and language understanding only, whereas psychologists broaden it (Machery 2009). In this paper I do not provide arguments against the ambiguity view, but I assume the rival position, namely the view that ‘concept’ is a polysemous word, whose philosophical and psychological meaning are related. One way to relate them is to agree that concepts constitute a functional kind posited to explain some traits of human behaviour, as I said above (Weiskopf 2010, Lalumera 2010), and that (typical) psychological theories and (typical) philosophical theories of concepts diverge on the agenda of what has to be explained and in what order (Carey 2009). I will suggest that conceptions may deserve the same status.
References
Burge, T. (2009) Intellectual norms and the foundations of mind. Foundations of Mind, Oxford: OUP.
Carey, S. (2009) The origins of concepts. Oxford: OUP.
Criley, M. E. (2007). Contested concepts and competing conceptions. ProQuest.
Dworkin, R. (1988). Law's Empire. Harvard, Mass.:Harvard University Press.
Ericsson, K. A., Charness, P., Feltovich, J. E Hoffman, R. (a cura di) (2006). The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gallie , W. B. (1956) Essentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, 167-98.
Gelman, S. A. (2005). Psychological Science Agenda: May 2005. Psychological Science.
Goldman, (2001). Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 85-110.
Hampton, J. A. (2010). Concept talk cannot be avoided. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 212-213.
Lakoff, George. 2006a. Thinking points: Communicating our American values and vision : a progressive’s handbook. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Lalumera, E. (2010). Concepts are a functional kind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 217-218.
Machery, E. (2009). Doing without concepts (p. 210). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2007). The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations? 1. Noûs, 41(4), 561-593.
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical reasoning, pp. 179-195, Cambridge.
Millikan, R. (2005). Language: a Biological Model, Oxford: OUP.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. The MIT Press.
Peacocke, C. (1998). Implicit conceptions, understanding and rationality. Philosophical issues, 43-88.
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1999
Rey, G. (1985) Concepts and conceptions: A reply to Smith, Medin and Rips. Cognition 19:297–303.
Rey, G. (2010). Concepts versus conceptions (again). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3), 221-222.
Selinger, E. e Crease, R. (eds.) (2006). The Philosophy of Expertise. New York: Columbia University Press.
Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell
ALL WELCOME!
--
LanCog Research Group
www.lancog.com
Centro de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
2 de março de 2014
Susan Carey (Harvard University): Petrus Hispanus Lectures 2014
Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog - Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group
Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica
PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Petrus Hispanus Lectures 2014
Susan Carey (Harvard University)
Lecture I. The Origin of Concepts: Natural Number
27 May 2014, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Abstract: Alone among animals, humans can ponder the causes and cures of pancreatic cancer or global warming. How are we to account for the human capacity to create concepts such as electron, cancer, infinity, galaxy, and democracy? A theory of conceptual development must have three components. First, it must characterize the innate representational repertoire—that is, the representations that subsequent learning processes utilize. Second, it must describe how the initial stock of representations differs from the adult conceptual system. Third, it must characterize the learning mechanisms that achieve the transformation of the initial into the final state. I defend three theses. With respect to the initial state, contrary to historically important thinkers such as the British empiricists, Quine, and Piaget, as well as many contemporary scientists, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual or sensory-motor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, contrary to “continuity theorists” such as Fodor, Pinker, Macnamara and others, conceptual development involves qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than and sometimes incommensurable with those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping. I take on two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science: 1) I show how (and in what ways) learning can lead to increases in expressive power and 2) I show how to defeat mad dog concept nativism. I challenge Fodor's claims that all learning is hypothesis testing, and that the only way new concepts can be constructed is by assembling them from developmental primitives, using the combinatorial machinery of the syntax of the language of thought. These points are illustrated through a case study of the origin of representations of natural number.
Lecture II. The Origin of Concepts: Logical connectives and abstract relations
29 May 2014, 15:00
Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon
Abstract: In lecture I I argue for innate domain specific systems of representations, systems of core cognition, illustrating with two such systems with numerical content. Systems of core cognition are perception like in many ways: the format of representation is most likely iconic, and entity identification is supported by innate perceptual analyzers. The existence of systems of core cognition, so specified, does not preclude the existence of innate representations with different properties. Here I consider what form innate support for logic might take. Logical connectives (or, not…) and symbols for abstract relations (e.g., same) are not likely to be iconic in format nor perception like in any way. At issue is whether non-linguistic animals, and/or prelinguistic human infants, have a logic-like, language-like, Language of Thought, capable of propositional representations formulated over discrete arbitrary symbols. I will present the progress we have made on addressing this question around two case studies: reasoning according to the disjunctive syllogism (A or B, not A, therefore B) and representations of the abstract relations same and different.
Lecture I. The Origin of Concepts: Natural Number
27 May 2014, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Abstract: Alone among animals, humans can ponder the causes and cures of pancreatic cancer or global warming. How are we to account for the human capacity to create concepts such as electron, cancer, infinity, galaxy, and democracy? A theory of conceptual development must have three components. First, it must characterize the innate representational repertoire—that is, the representations that subsequent learning processes utilize. Second, it must describe how the initial stock of representations differs from the adult conceptual system. Third, it must characterize the learning mechanisms that achieve the transformation of the initial into the final state. I defend three theses. With respect to the initial state, contrary to historically important thinkers such as the British empiricists, Quine, and Piaget, as well as many contemporary scientists, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual or sensory-motor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, contrary to “continuity theorists” such as Fodor, Pinker, Macnamara and others, conceptual development involves qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than and sometimes incommensurable with those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping. I take on two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science: 1) I show how (and in what ways) learning can lead to increases in expressive power and 2) I show how to defeat mad dog concept nativism. I challenge Fodor's claims that all learning is hypothesis testing, and that the only way new concepts can be constructed is by assembling them from developmental primitives, using the combinatorial machinery of the syntax of the language of thought. These points are illustrated through a case study of the origin of representations of natural number.
Lecture II. The Origin of Concepts: Logical connectives and abstract relations
29 May 2014, 15:00
Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon
Abstract: In lecture I I argue for innate domain specific systems of representations, systems of core cognition, illustrating with two such systems with numerical content. Systems of core cognition are perception like in many ways: the format of representation is most likely iconic, and entity identification is supported by innate perceptual analyzers. The existence of systems of core cognition, so specified, does not preclude the existence of innate representations with different properties. Here I consider what form innate support for logic might take. Logical connectives (or, not…) and symbols for abstract relations (e.g., same) are not likely to be iconic in format nor perception like in any way. At issue is whether non-linguistic animals, and/or prelinguistic human infants, have a logic-like, language-like, Language of Thought, capable of propositional representations formulated over discrete arbitrary symbols. I will present the progress we have made on addressing this question around two case studies: reasoning according to the disjunctive syllogism (A or B, not A, therefore B) and representations of the abstract relations same and different.
Free Admission
The Petrus Hispanus Lectures are delivered every other academic year at the University of Lisbon by a leading figure in current research about the nature of mind, cognition and language. Previous Petrus Hispanus Lecturers: Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Richard Jeffrey, Ned Block, David Kaplan, Tyler Burge, Timothy Williamson.
Sponsors: Faculdade de Psicologia da UL, Faculdade de Letras da UL, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
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LanCog Research Group
LanCog Research Group
Centro de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
4 de dezembro de 2013
Célia Teixeira: The a priori and the analytic: the traditional connection
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
LANCOG SEMINAR
2013-14: Session 7
The a priori and the analytic: the traditional connection
Célia Teixeira
University of Lisbon
6 de Dezembro de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: The aim of this talk is to evaluate and criticise the account according to which a priori knowledge is mere knowledge of analytic truths. This account is based on two major claims:
(The Traditional Connection – TC) A priori knowledge is mere knowledge of analytic truths.
(The Explanatory Thesis – ET) We can explain the a priori with the notion of analyticity.
Depending on how we understand the notion of analyticity, (TC) and (ET) will get different readings. There are two main readings of the notion of analyticity: a metaphysical reading and an epistemological reading. I will argue that under the metaphysical reading, even if (TC) is true, (ET) is false. But we have well known reasons to doubt the intelligibility of the metaphysical reading of the notion of analyticity – and with it the intelligibility of both (TC) and (ET). I will then turn my attention to the epistemological reading of the notion of analyticity. I will argue that under this reading it is also the case that if (TC) is true, (ET) is false. I will then argue, contrary to current orthodoxy, that (TC) is false under the epistemological reading. If I am right, and both (TC) and (ET) are false under both readings of the notion of analyticity, we have good reasons to question the philosophical significance and the very tenability of the analytic/synthetic distinction.
ALL WELCOME!
--
LanCog Research Group
www.lancog.com
Centro de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
27 de novembro de 2013
Anna Marmodoro: Aristotle on the Problem of Common Sensibles
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2013-14: Session 2
Aristotle on the Problem of Common Sensibles
Anna Marmodoro
University of Oxford
29 November 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: Aristotle draws a distinction between qualities that are perceptible via a single sense only, the special sensibles, and qualities that are perceptible via more than one sense at once, the common sensibles. Why is this distinction important to Aristotle and how does he justify it? What are the ontology and the epistemology of the common sensibles, in light of Aristotle’s assumption that each sense organ is sensitive to only its own special sensibles? Does the problem of how the common sensibles get perceived give us reasons for giving up a ‘separatist’ view of sense experiences? Or rather can it be solved by postulating extra perceptual powers for the senses? Are more ‘parsimonious’ options viable? In this paper I engage with these and related questions, which have attracted the interest of Aristotelian scholars (Gregoric 2007, Johansen 2012) and philosophers of the mind (Tye 2007) alike. I offer my own reading of Aristotle’s account and examine its philosophical viability.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
2013-14: Session 2
Aristotle on the Problem of Common Sensibles
Anna Marmodoro
University of Oxford
29 November 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: Aristotle draws a distinction between qualities that are perceptible via a single sense only, the special sensibles, and qualities that are perceptible via more than one sense at once, the common sensibles. Why is this distinction important to Aristotle and how does he justify it? What are the ontology and the epistemology of the common sensibles, in light of Aristotle’s assumption that each sense organ is sensitive to only its own special sensibles? Does the problem of how the common sensibles get perceived give us reasons for giving up a ‘separatist’ view of sense experiences? Or rather can it be solved by postulating extra perceptual powers for the senses? Are more ‘parsimonious’ options viable? In this paper I engage with these and related questions, which have attracted the interest of Aristotelian scholars (Gregoric 2007, Johansen 2012) and philosophers of the mind (Tye 2007) alike. I offer my own reading of Aristotle’s account and examine its philosophical viability.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
13 de novembro de 2013
Conferência de Teresa Marques: Retractions
Retractions
Teresa Marques
University of Lisbon
15 de Novembro de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: Retraction and disagreement data have been used against contextualism and in favor of relativism about certain types of claims. Among these figure epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, or value and personal taste claims. On the relativist proposal, sentences like “the ice cream might be in the fridge” or “Pocoyo is funny” only get assigned a truth-value relative to contexts of utterance, indices of evaluation, and contexts of assessment. On assessment relativism, the relevant perspective for the truth of an epistemic might claim, or of a claim of personal taste, is the epistemic evidence, or the standard of taste, of the assessor at the context of assessment. On contextualism (indexical or not) the relevant perspective is the epistemic evidence, or the standard of taste, that is determined at the context of utterance. It is the claim that contextualism cannot handle retraction and disagreement data that requires the admission of contexts of assessment. Assessment-relativism takes retractions to have a special normative role: a retraction is allegedly mandatory in the crucial cases where the contextualist does not obligate any retraction. This talk questions that retractions have such a normative role, and offers an alternative explanation that is compatible with contextualism. The aim is to show that assessment relativism is not a viable semantic alternative. I will first summarize the main objections in the literature against the obligatoriness of retractions in the crucial cases. I will then offer a suggestion for how a contextualist (indexical or not) can explain permissible retractions, without requiring contexts of assessment. If time allows, I'll also try to show that the objections to assessment relativism follow a general pattern of criticism.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
LANCOG SEMINAR
2013-14: Session 5
28 de agosto de 2013
23 de junho de 2013
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
29-31 August 2013
http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com
REGISTRATION NOW OPEN
Registration is free, but if you're intending to attend, please do register (see below).
Invited speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)
Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s College London)
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)
Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)
Anand Vaidya (San José State University).
Confirmed accepted contributions:
Alexandre Billon (Université Lille-III)
Ottavio Bueno (University of Miami) and Scott Shalkowski (University of Leeds)
Bob Fischer (Texas State University-San Marcos)
Dusko Prelevic (University of Belgrade)
Registration:
By sending an email to EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com.
Please include ‘registration’ in the subject, and let us know your name and affiliation (if applicable) in the mail's body.
Organizers:
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).
12 de dezembro de 2012
Counterfactual Abduction and the Inference to the Best Explanation
14th December 2012, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia)
Counterfactual Abduction and the Inference to the Best Explanation
Moritz Schulz (Logos Group, University of Barcelona)
Abstract: Counterfactuals give rise to a kind of inference
(counterfactual abduction) strikingly similar to what is usually called the inference to the best explanation. On the other hand, counterfactuals seem to play a major role in inferences to the best explanation. This suggests that the two kinds of inferences could be accounted for in a unified way. I will argue that both types of inferences can be seen as a certain kind of exclusion argument which starts with a simple disjunction of hypotheses (in the case of counterfactual abduction) or with a disjunction of potential explanations (in the case of the inference to the best explanation) and then proceeds in counterfactual terms. As a result, it will turn out that both types of abduction owe their evidential import to the availability of a corresponding deductive argument. In the form of a slogan: abduction is just a special kind of deduction.
(counterfactual abduction) strikingly similar to what is usually called the inference to the best explanation. On the other hand, counterfactuals seem to play a major role in inferences to the best explanation. This suggests that the two kinds of inferences could be accounted for in a unified way. I will argue that both types of inferences can be seen as a certain kind of exclusion argument which starts with a simple disjunction of hypotheses (in the case of counterfactual abduction) or with a disjunction of potential explanations (in the case of the inference to the best explanation) and then proceeds in counterfactual terms. As a result, it will turn out that both types of abduction owe their evidential import to the availability of a corresponding deductive argument. In the form of a slogan: abduction is just a special kind of deduction.
9 de dezembro de 2012
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
29-31 August 2013
http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com
Van Inwagen once wrote (in his influential paper ‘Modal epistemology’
from 1998) that “modal epistemology is a subject about which little is
known”. Today, the discipline has flourished. A lot has been written
since then and research on the topic continues to be the focus of a
large community of philosophers. We certainly know more today about
the topic than we did in 1998, but it would be daring to say that our
epistemic situation is much better. The discipline has witnessed a
Rationalist Renaissance and is now witnessing what might end up being
an anti-rationalist turn.
This workshop aims to provide a forum for discussion and to reflect,
via the contributed talks and informal discussions, the state of art
of the discipline.
Invited Speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)
Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at
Aberdeen; King’s College London)
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)
Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)
Anand Vaidya (San José State University)
Organizers:
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia
Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).
Call for Abstracts
We invite submissions of long abstracts (1000-2000 words) on any
aspect in the epistemology of modality. The time slot is 90 minutes
distributed thus: 50’ talk + 40’ discussion.
For refereeing purposes, abstracts should contain a clear statement of
the thesis that will be defended in the talk as well as of the
argumentative strategy. They should be prepared for blind-refereeing.
We aim at accepting 5 abstracts.
Submission Procedure: Please send your abstract to
EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com as an attachment (.pdf
preferred).
The subject of the e-mail should contain the word ‘submission’.
The body of the email should include your name, affiliation, abstract
title, and the email address you want us to use to communicate with
you.
Deadline for submissions: 28th February 2013.
Notification of acceptance/non-acceptance: 28th May 2013.
Scientific Committee:
João Branquinho (Universidade de Lisboa); David Chalmers (Australian
National University; New York University); Bob Hale (University of
Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s
College London); Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling); Daniele
Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila); and Anand Vaidya (San José State
University).
Registration:
There are no registration fees, but registration will be required.
Details on how to register will follow in due course, before
registration opens on the 1st of June 2013.
Sponsors of the Workshop:
LanCog - Research Group in Language, Mind and Cognition
FCT Project - Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
FCT - Fundação para Ciência e Tecnologia, Ministério da Educação e Ciência
CFUL - Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa
FLUL - Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa
QREN - Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional
18 de abril de 2012
Timothy Williamson: Logic, Science, and Metaphysics
PETRUS HISPANUS LECTURES 2012
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON
Wykeham Professor of Logic
University of Oxford
LOGIC, SCIENCE, AND METAPHYSICS
5 and 6 June 2012, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Room: Anfiteatro 4
Lecture 1: Logics as Scientific Theories
The similarities between logic and other branches of science are
usually underestimated. Like other scientific theories, logics can be
compared and assessed abductively in terms of their simplicity,
strength, elegance, and consistency with what is already known.
Tarski’s definition of logical truth provides a suitable standard of
correctness for them to aim at. Such an account can avoid the
objectionable features of Quine’s holism.
Lecture 2: Modal Logic as Metaphysics
The second lecture is a case study of the methodology described in the
first, applied to modal logic with a metaphysical interpretation of
the modal operators. Some consequences will be drawn out for possible
worlds model theory and the question of whether there could have been
things that do not actually exist. The relevance of higher-order modal
logic for these issues will also be explained.
The Petrus Hispanus Lectures are delivered every other academic year
at the University of Lisbon by a leading figure in current research
about the nature of mind, cognition and language. Previous Petrus
Hispanus Lecturers: Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Richard Jeffrey,
Ned Block, David Kaplan, Tyler Burge.
1 de setembro de 2011
On the Epistemology of Essence
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
SEMINÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA
SEMINÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA
2011-12: Session 1
Sonia Roca Royes(University of Stirling)
On the Epistemology of Essence
9 de Setembro de 2011, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract. There are several strategies to defend rationalism in modality. Among them, a salient option is the family of views—which I shall call ‘concept-based epistemologies of modality’—according to which modal knowledge is a priori because fundamentally analytic or conceptual. A first, pessimistic diagnosis about them is that, although they might have
sufficient potential to elucidate de dicto modal knowledge, they are not adequate as an elucidation of de re modal knowledge; the ultimate reasons for this being that they fail to elucidate the knowability conditions of essential truths. This brings me, specifically, to the epistemology of essence. In this paper, however, I shall qualify the diagnosis above.
First, it will appear (§2) that some concept-based epistemologies of modality can elucidate certain kind of (de re) essentialist principles. Second (§3), there might be domains such that knowledge of de dicto essential truths in that domain and knowledge of de re essential truths in that domain are not isolatable. As a result, if there are indeed such domains, and to the extent that concept-based accounts are fine as far as de dicto modal knowledge is concerned, these accounts will be able to elucidate de re modal knowledge for those domains. After scrutiny, however, these qualifications do not substantially improve the prospects of concept-based epistemologies if modality.
Admission Free
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras
da Universidade de Lisboa
For further information, please contact:
Professor João Branquinho
Department of Philosophy, Faculdade de Letras
Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
1600-214 Lisboa
Portugal
Telephone +(351)217920000
Fax +(351)217920063
jbranquinho@netcabo.pt
jbranquinho@fl.ul.pt
j.valadasbranquinho@new.oxon.org
Webpage: http://www.joaobranquinho.com
CV DeGóis:
http://www.degois.pt/visualizador/curriculum.jsp?key=9510424644288603
Department of Philosophy, Faculdade de Letras
Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
1600-214 Lisboa
Portugal
Telephone +(351)217920000
Fax +(351)217920063
jbranquinho@netcabo.pt
jbranquinho@fl.ul.pt
j.valadasbranquinho@new.oxon.org
Webpage: http://www.joaobranquinho.com
CV DeGóis:
http://www.degois.pt/visualizador/curriculum.jsp?key=9510424644288603
10 de setembro de 2009
Tyler Burge
Organização: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (Grupo Lancog); Departamento de
Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa.
Contacto: Prof. Doutora Adriana Silva Graça
adrianasg@netcabo.pt
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