Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Filosofia da Mente. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Filosofia da Mente. Mostrar todas as mensagens

3 de junho de 2013

Sara Bizarro: The Puzzle of Mental Imagery

SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 14

The Puzzle of Mental Imagery
Sara Bizarro (University of Lisbon, LanCog Group)

7 de Junho de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The mental imagery debate, a debate about the nature of certain allegedly pictorial mental representations, is still undecided. On one side of the debate, we have those who argue that mental imagery is propositional in its nature, or at least a lot less pictorial than we like to think, while on the other side of the debate, we have those who defend that mental imagery is essentially pictorial in nature. In this paper, an attempt is made to clarify both positions with the examples usually brought up to illustrate them. In view of these examples, some conclusions are reached. Mental imagery is said to be not very detailed and have pictorial aspects that are similar to those that exist in regular perception. Mental imagery is also said to be cognitively permeable. Elaborate encoding across modalities is said to be more efficient than within modalities, thus supporting a dual code hypothesis of mental representation.

Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL


ALL WELCOME!

24 de fevereiro de 2012

Fiora Salis: On Currie's Problem of Tragedy



SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2011-12: Session 5
On Currie’s Problem of Tragedy
Fiora Salis (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon, and LOGOS Group, University of Barcelona)
2 March 2012, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: Over the past decade philosophers and cognitive scientists have been increasingly interested in issues related to the distinction between genuine desire and a hypothetical imaginative counterpart of desire. Gregory Currie recently argued in favor of the introduction of desire-like imaginings by investigating the nature of the mental states involved in our response to tragic fictions. My aim in this paper is to articulate Currie’s argument, disarm it and furthermore peruse its consequences. The hypothesis is that our response to tragic fictions involves genuine desires, although certain necessary refinements will be offered.
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa

Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-F​IL/121209/​2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL


For further information, please contact
Professor João Branquinho
Department of Philosophy
Faculdade de Letras
Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
1600-214 Lisboa
Portugal
Telephone +(351)217920000
Fax +(351)217920063
jbranquinho@campus.ul.pt
Webpage: http://joaobranquinho.weebly.com
CV DeGóis: http://www.degois.pt/visualizador/curriculum.jsp?key=9510424644288603

23 de outubro de 2010

19 de junho de 2010

Biosemiotics

Biosemiotics:
A Naturalistic Approach to the Question of Meaning

Seminário de Filosofia Analítica, Jesper Hoffmeyer
21 de Junho 16:00 – 18:00
Sala Matos Romão, Departamento de Filosofia

Signs, whether of natural or cultural origin, act by provoking receptive systems - human or non-human - to form interpretants (e.g. a movement or a brain activity) that somehow relates the system to this "something else". Semiotics sees meaning as connected to the formation of interpretants. In a biosemiotic understanding living systems are basically engaged in semiotic interactions, i.e. interpretative processes, and organic evolution exhibits an inherent tendency toward an increase in semiotic freedom. Mammals are generally equipped with more semiotic freedom than are their reptilian ancestor species, and fishes are more semiotically sophisticated than are invertebrates. The evolutionary trend towards the production of life forms with an increasing interpretative capacity or semiotic freedom implies that the production of meaning has become an essential survival parameter in later stages of evolution.

24 de maio de 2010

Matthieu Ricard

Conferência de Matthieu Ricard na Aula Magna da Reitoria (26 de Maio, às 21h), com o apoio do projecto Filosofia e Religião do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.

2 de março de 2010

"Science without Data?" conferência adiada para 5 Março

A conferência de Sara Bizarro, "Science Without Data? Phenomenal Consciousness and Heterophenomenology" foi adiada para esta próxima sexta-feira (5 de Março de 2010, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão, Departamento de Filosofia).

22 de fevereiro de 2010

Science without data? Phenomenal Consciousness and Heterophenomenology

SEMINÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA

2009-10: Sessão 5
Sara Bizarro
(Universidade de Lisboa, LanCog Group)

Science Without Data?
Phenomenal Consciousness and Heterophenomenology.

26 de Fevereiro de 2010, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão, Departamento de Filosofia

Abstract: The word consciousness is used for several types of mental events: wakefulness, attention, recalling, emotions, thoughts, beliefs, self-consciousness etc. Cognitive Science and Psychology research these types of events. Phenomenal Consciousness is defined in the Philosophy of Mind as "subjective experience" or as the "what it is like for somebody to be that person in that moment". All the mental events listed above are usually accompanied by some sort of phenomenal subjective feeling for those experiencing them. In contemporary Philosophy of Mind it is often argued that this phenomenal side of consciousness cannot be the object of scientific enquiry (Chalmers) and that, therefore, a science of consciousness is doomed from the start (Nagel). On the other side of the debate, heterophenomenologists (Dennett) argue that we are justified in using reports of individuals regarding their subjective experience as data in our scientific enquiries about consciousness. In this talk I will discuss weather the reports of subjects can be considered reliable data for a scientific study of consciousness using as reference the debate about the legitimacy of mental imagery reports presented by Pylyshyn, Shepard and Kosslyn

http://lancog.org/events.html 
Apoios: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa

10 de novembro de 2009

A Humanidade e o Cosmos



Realiza-se na Universidade Fernando Pessoa (Porto), nos próximos dias 13 e 14 de Novembro, o 3ºSimpósio Internacional Fronteiras da Ciência dedicado ao tema: "A Humanidade e o Cosmos: à procura do Outro e de Si Mesmo", no qual Paulo Borges (14/XI) e Carlos João Correia (13/XI) proferirão duas conferências.

10 de setembro de 2009

Tyler Burge



Organização: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (Grupo Lancog); Departamento de
Filosofia da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa.
Contacto: Prof. Doutora Adriana Silva Graça
adrianasg@netcabo.pt