Clique na imagem para ler a informação em boas condições.
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Lógica. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Lógica. Mostrar todas as mensagens
26 de maio de 2014
2 de março de 2014
Susan Carey (Harvard University): Petrus Hispanus Lectures 2014
Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog - Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group
Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica
PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Petrus Hispanus Lectures 2014
Susan Carey (Harvard University)
Lecture I. The Origin of Concepts: Natural Number
27 May 2014, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Abstract: Alone among animals, humans can ponder the causes and cures of pancreatic cancer or global warming. How are we to account for the human capacity to create concepts such as electron, cancer, infinity, galaxy, and democracy? A theory of conceptual development must have three components. First, it must characterize the innate representational repertoire—that is, the representations that subsequent learning processes utilize. Second, it must describe how the initial stock of representations differs from the adult conceptual system. Third, it must characterize the learning mechanisms that achieve the transformation of the initial into the final state. I defend three theses. With respect to the initial state, contrary to historically important thinkers such as the British empiricists, Quine, and Piaget, as well as many contemporary scientists, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual or sensory-motor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, contrary to “continuity theorists” such as Fodor, Pinker, Macnamara and others, conceptual development involves qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than and sometimes incommensurable with those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping. I take on two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science: 1) I show how (and in what ways) learning can lead to increases in expressive power and 2) I show how to defeat mad dog concept nativism. I challenge Fodor's claims that all learning is hypothesis testing, and that the only way new concepts can be constructed is by assembling them from developmental primitives, using the combinatorial machinery of the syntax of the language of thought. These points are illustrated through a case study of the origin of representations of natural number.
Lecture II. The Origin of Concepts: Logical connectives and abstract relations
29 May 2014, 15:00
Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon
Abstract: In lecture I I argue for innate domain specific systems of representations, systems of core cognition, illustrating with two such systems with numerical content. Systems of core cognition are perception like in many ways: the format of representation is most likely iconic, and entity identification is supported by innate perceptual analyzers. The existence of systems of core cognition, so specified, does not preclude the existence of innate representations with different properties. Here I consider what form innate support for logic might take. Logical connectives (or, not…) and symbols for abstract relations (e.g., same) are not likely to be iconic in format nor perception like in any way. At issue is whether non-linguistic animals, and/or prelinguistic human infants, have a logic-like, language-like, Language of Thought, capable of propositional representations formulated over discrete arbitrary symbols. I will present the progress we have made on addressing this question around two case studies: reasoning according to the disjunctive syllogism (A or B, not A, therefore B) and representations of the abstract relations same and different.
Lecture I. The Origin of Concepts: Natural Number
27 May 2014, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Abstract: Alone among animals, humans can ponder the causes and cures of pancreatic cancer or global warming. How are we to account for the human capacity to create concepts such as electron, cancer, infinity, galaxy, and democracy? A theory of conceptual development must have three components. First, it must characterize the innate representational repertoire—that is, the representations that subsequent learning processes utilize. Second, it must describe how the initial stock of representations differs from the adult conceptual system. Third, it must characterize the learning mechanisms that achieve the transformation of the initial into the final state. I defend three theses. With respect to the initial state, contrary to historically important thinkers such as the British empiricists, Quine, and Piaget, as well as many contemporary scientists, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual or sensory-motor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, contrary to “continuity theorists” such as Fodor, Pinker, Macnamara and others, conceptual development involves qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than and sometimes incommensurable with those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping. I take on two of Fodor's challenges to cognitive science: 1) I show how (and in what ways) learning can lead to increases in expressive power and 2) I show how to defeat mad dog concept nativism. I challenge Fodor's claims that all learning is hypothesis testing, and that the only way new concepts can be constructed is by assembling them from developmental primitives, using the combinatorial machinery of the syntax of the language of thought. These points are illustrated through a case study of the origin of representations of natural number.
Lecture II. The Origin of Concepts: Logical connectives and abstract relations
29 May 2014, 15:00
Faculty of Psychology, University of Lisbon
Abstract: In lecture I I argue for innate domain specific systems of representations, systems of core cognition, illustrating with two such systems with numerical content. Systems of core cognition are perception like in many ways: the format of representation is most likely iconic, and entity identification is supported by innate perceptual analyzers. The existence of systems of core cognition, so specified, does not preclude the existence of innate representations with different properties. Here I consider what form innate support for logic might take. Logical connectives (or, not…) and symbols for abstract relations (e.g., same) are not likely to be iconic in format nor perception like in any way. At issue is whether non-linguistic animals, and/or prelinguistic human infants, have a logic-like, language-like, Language of Thought, capable of propositional representations formulated over discrete arbitrary symbols. I will present the progress we have made on addressing this question around two case studies: reasoning according to the disjunctive syllogism (A or B, not A, therefore B) and representations of the abstract relations same and different.
Free Admission
The Petrus Hispanus Lectures are delivered every other academic year at the University of Lisbon by a leading figure in current research about the nature of mind, cognition and language. Previous Petrus Hispanus Lecturers: Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Richard Jeffrey, Ned Block, David Kaplan, Tyler Burge, Timothy Williamson.
Sponsors: Faculdade de Psicologia da UL, Faculdade de Letras da UL, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
--
LanCog Research Group
LanCog Research Group
Centro de Filosofia
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Alameda da Universidade
Lisboa
1600-214
Portugal
30 de janeiro de 2014
9 de março de 2013
Numbers and Everything
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 6
Numbers and Everything
Gonçalo Santos (LanCog Group, Universidade de Lisboa)
15 de Março de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: I begin by drawing a parallel between the intuitionistic understanding of quantification over all natural numbers and the generality relativist understanding of quantification over absolutely everything. I then argue that adoption of an intuitionistic reading of relativism not only provides an immediate reply to the absolutist's charge of incoherence but it also throws a new light on the debates surrounding absolute generality.
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: I begin by drawing a parallel between the intuitionistic understanding of quantification over all natural numbers and the generality relativist understanding of quantification over absolutely everything. I then argue that adoption of an intuitionistic reading of relativism not only provides an immediate reply to the absolutist's charge of incoherence but it also throws a new light on the debates surrounding absolute generality.
ALL WELCOME!
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
28 de fevereiro de 2013
Logic is Metaphysics
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 5
Logic is Metaphysics
Daniel Durante (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte e LanCog, Universidade de Lisboa)
1 de Março de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: Analyzing the position of two philosophers whose views are recognizably divergent, W. O. Quine and M. Dummett, we intend to support a striking point of agreement between them: the idea that our logical principles constitute our principles about what there is, and therefore, that logic is metaphysics.
ENTRADA LIVRE
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
16 de fevereiro de 2013
Uma Semântica Simples para Existenciais Negativas
SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 4
Uma Semântica Simples para Existenciais Negativas
João Branquinho (Universidade de Lisboa, LanCog)
22 Fevereiro 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Resumo: É proposta uma semântica simples para um fragmento importante de predicações singulares de inexistência, frases usualmente tidas como semanticamente problemáticas. O tratamento adoptado depende de duas suposições substantivas de partida: (a) a suposição de que as frases em questão são, do ponto de vista da sua forma lógica, aquilo que parecem ser; (b) a suposição de que o predicado de existência que aí ocorre é um predicado lógico, universal. E depende ainda, mais crucialmente, de uma tese semântica algo controversa acerca da referência singular: a tese de que nomes próprios e outros termos singulares são designadores, não apenas rígidos, mas obstinadamente rígidos, dos objectos que de facto designam (Kaplan). Isto significa o seguinte: uma vez atribuído a um desses termos um objecto como sendo o referente do termo relativamente a um contexto de uso, o termo designará esse objecto com respeito a qualquer estado possível do mundo ou ocasião. Por conseguinte, tal objecto será o objecto referido pelo termo mesmo em relação a estados do mundo ou ocasiões nos quais o objecto em questão não exista. Se isto for correcto, parece haver um sentido no qual a existência não é necessária para a referência, no qual nos podemos referir àquilo que não existe. No entanto, daí não se segue, ou pelo menos não queremos que daí se siga, que há coisas que não existem.
Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL
18 de abril de 2012
Timothy Williamson: Logic, Science, and Metaphysics
PETRUS HISPANUS LECTURES 2012
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON
Wykeham Professor of Logic
University of Oxford
LOGIC, SCIENCE, AND METAPHYSICS
5 and 6 June 2012, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Room: Anfiteatro 4
Lecture 1: Logics as Scientific Theories
The similarities between logic and other branches of science are
usually underestimated. Like other scientific theories, logics can be
compared and assessed abductively in terms of their simplicity,
strength, elegance, and consistency with what is already known.
Tarski’s definition of logical truth provides a suitable standard of
correctness for them to aim at. Such an account can avoid the
objectionable features of Quine’s holism.
Lecture 2: Modal Logic as Metaphysics
The second lecture is a case study of the methodology described in the
first, applied to modal logic with a metaphysical interpretation of
the modal operators. Some consequences will be drawn out for possible
worlds model theory and the question of whether there could have been
things that do not actually exist. The relevance of higher-order modal
logic for these issues will also be explained.
The Petrus Hispanus Lectures are delivered every other academic year
at the University of Lisbon by a leading figure in current research
about the nature of mind, cognition and language. Previous Petrus
Hispanus Lecturers: Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Richard Jeffrey,
Ned Block, David Kaplan, Tyler Burge.
1 de outubro de 2011
On the notion of object. A logical genealogy
SEMINÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA
2011-12: Session 2
On the notion of object. A logical genealogy.
.
Fernando Ferreira
(Universidade de Lisboa)
14 de Outubro de 2011, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: We argue that logic is not a uniform terrain where all truths lie on a par. We analyze the apparatus of first-order classical logic with identity into two main ingredients: a deeper and wider component and, on top of it, a narrower component which consists of principles that articulate our modern notion of object.
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras
da Universidade de Lisboa
2011-12: Session 2
On the notion of object. A logical genealogy.
.
Fernando Ferreira
(Universidade de Lisboa)
14 de Outubro de 2011, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Abstract: We argue that logic is not a uniform terrain where all truths lie on a par. We analyze the apparatus of first-order classical logic with identity into two main ingredients: a deeper and wider component and, on top of it, a narrower component which consists of principles that articulate our modern notion of object.
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras
da Universidade de Lisboa
27 de abril de 2011
O Naturalismo de Neurath e a Questão da Consistência
SEMINÁRIO DE FILOSOFIA ANALÍTICA
2010-11: Sessão 4
Nelson Gonçalves Gomes
(Universidade de Brasília)
O Naturalismo de Neurath e a Questão da Consistência
6 de Maio de 2011, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Resumo: A recente literatura especializada propõe uma nova forma de entendimento do formalismo de Hilbert, com ênfase sobre a ideia da apresentação autônoma do pensamento matemático, livre das tentativas de fundamentação que busquem bases na filosofia. Essa interessante tendência sugere que se repensem temas análogos desenvolvidos por Otto Neurath, cuja concepção de proposições protocolares é claramente enigmática. Por que Neurath insiste, reiteradas vezes, na necessidade de consistência de um conjunto de proposições que abrigue protocolos? Neurath é reticente ao falar sobre verdade, mas por que não o é no que diz respeito à exigência de consistência? A conferência versará sobre o tipo peculiar de antifilosofia com o auxílio da qual Neurath esquematizou a sua forma radical de naturalismo.
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
2010-11: Sessão 4
Nelson Gonçalves Gomes
(Universidade de Brasília)
O Naturalismo de Neurath e a Questão da Consistência
6 de Maio de 2011, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)
Resumo: A recente literatura especializada propõe uma nova forma de entendimento do formalismo de Hilbert, com ênfase sobre a ideia da apresentação autônoma do pensamento matemático, livre das tentativas de fundamentação que busquem bases na filosofia. Essa interessante tendência sugere que se repensem temas análogos desenvolvidos por Otto Neurath, cuja concepção de proposições protocolares é claramente enigmática. Por que Neurath insiste, reiteradas vezes, na necessidade de consistência de um conjunto de proposições que abrigue protocolos? Neurath é reticente ao falar sobre verdade, mas por que não o é no que diz respeito à exigência de consistência? A conferência versará sobre o tipo peculiar de antifilosofia com o auxílio da qual Neurath esquematizou a sua forma radical de naturalismo.
Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
16 de março de 2011
A Herança de Hilbert na Filosofia e os Fundamentos da Matemática
CÁTEDRA A RAZÃO
16 DE MARÇO
18 horas, Sala 5.2.
Faculdade de Letras da UL
AUGUSTO J. FRANCO OLIVEIRA
A HERANÇA DE HILBERT NA FILOSOFIA
E FUNDAMENTOS DA MATEMÁTICA
RESUMO
David Hilbert (1862-1943) foi o maior expoente da corrente filosófica nos fundamentos conhecida por formalismo. Esta corrente informa o chamado programa de Hilbert, essencialmente um programa de validação dos sistemas axiomáticos através de provas finitárias de consistência ou não contradição. É afirmação recorrente que os metateoremas de incompletude de Gödel (1931) deitaram por terra estas pretensões de Hilbert. Todavia, termos como "formalismo", "prova finitária" não foram definidos com precisão, por um lado, e os matemáticos (antes e depois dos sucessos e insucessos nos fundamentos nas primeiras três décadas do séc. XX) aderiram firmemente aos métodos axiomáticos, levando as ideias de Hilbert aos seus limites, por outro. A exposição faz um curto historial dos principais acontecimentos e posições filosóficas ligadas ao formalismo hilbertiano e à sua sobrevivência na prática matemática corrente.
18 de fevereiro de 2011
Plural Quantification and Modality
Clique na imagem para ler a informação em boas condições.
Conferência de Gabriel Uzquiano da Universidade de Oxford: "Plural Quantification and Modality" (25 de Fevereiro, 16h).
Identity is a modally inflexible relation: if objects are identical, then they are necessarily identical. The necessity of identity is generally supported by the combination of Leibniz's law of indiscernibility of identicals and the premise that every object is necessarily self-identical. How special is identity in this respect? Do any other relations have a comparable claim to modal inflexibility? In particular, we will look at the relation one object bears to some objects iff it is "one of" them. Is it the case that if one object is one of them, then it is necessarily one of them? What could be the justification for this claim?
17 de julho de 2010
1 de junho de 2010
Acerca da Espontaneidade da Razão
António Zilhão participa na Sessão Comemorativa da 2ªedição de O Teorema de Gödel e a Hipótese do Contínuo (Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2009) com uma intervenção intitulada "Acerca da Espontaneidade da Razão"
17 de abril de 2010
Hartry Field em Letras
April 26
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia), 16:00
Hartry Field (New York University)
Is there a problem about revising Logic?
How, if at all, can one rationally change which logic one employs? I'll reply both to those who think we can't and to those who minimize the problems of doing so, and suggest a model for how such rational change might occur. I'll connect the discussion with a real example: the issues surrounding what I take to be a serious though not incontrovertible case for logical revision.
4 de janeiro de 2010
Conferência de Gonçalo Santos
A Not So Fine Modal Version of General Relativism
8 de Janeiro de 2010, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão, Departamento de Filosofia
Abstract: Russell's Paradox is standardly interpreted as showing that there cannot be a set of all sets. But at the same time that it establishes something, this result raises some peculiar questions. One could ask, for example, how to understand a collection that is not a set or why is it that there cannot be a set of all sets. In the following we will say some things about the first question, but will be particularly concerned with an answer that has been provided for the second. We thus begin by presenting the naive and the iterative conceptions of set, describe the construction of the set-theoretical hierarchy and discuss the notion of proper class. The discussion then moves on to whether it is possible to make sense of the claim that the set-theoretical hierarchy is to be understood as being indefinitely extensible. In particular, we discuss a modal version of generality relativism that has been put forward by Kit Fine and try to understand if it allows us to come up with a non self-defeating formulation of the generality relativist thesis. We will argue that Fine's modal version is not of much help in this task.
Apoios: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
8 de Janeiro de 2010, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão, Departamento de Filosofia
Abstract: Russell's Paradox is standardly interpreted as showing that there cannot be a set of all sets. But at the same time that it establishes something, this result raises some peculiar questions. One could ask, for example, how to understand a collection that is not a set or why is it that there cannot be a set of all sets. In the following we will say some things about the first question, but will be particularly concerned with an answer that has been provided for the second. We thus begin by presenting the naive and the iterative conceptions of set, describe the construction of the set-theoretical hierarchy and discuss the notion of proper class. The discussion then moves on to whether it is possible to make sense of the claim that the set-theoretical hierarchy is to be understood as being indefinitely extensible. In particular, we discuss a modal version of generality relativism that has been put forward by Kit Fine and try to understand if it allows us to come up with a non self-defeating formulation of the generality relativist thesis. We will argue that Fine's modal version is not of much help in this task.
Apoios: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Subscrever:
Mensagens (Atom)
Mensagens
