International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality

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International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality

International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
29-31 August 2013
http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com

REGISTRATION NOW OPEN
Registration is free, but if you're intending to attend, please do register (see below).

Invited speakers:

David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)

Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s College London)

Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)

Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)

Anand Vaidya (San José State University).

Confirmed accepted contributions:
Alexandre Billon (Université Lille-III)
Ottavio Bueno (University of Miami) and Scott Shalkowski (University of Leeds)
Bob Fischer (Texas State University-San Marcos)
Dusko Prelevic (University of Belgrade)

Registration:
By sending an email to EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com.
Please include ‘registration’ in the subject, and let us know your name and affiliation (if applicable) in the mail's body.

Organizers:
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).

Peter van Inwagen em Lisboa

LanCog Lectures in Metaphysics 2013 

Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame

Lecture 1: Modes of Being and Quantification
12 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Modes of Being and Quantification. Many philosophers have held that being comes in various kinds or sorts or “modes.” Existenz and Bestand (Meinong), for example, or existence and subsistence (Russell), or être-en-soi and être-pour-soi (Sartre), or Vorhandenheit, Zuhandenheit, and Existenz (Heidegger). But if that is the case, what is the relation between these modes and the existential (or particular) quantifier? Kris McDaniel, who is friendly to the idea of modes of being, has recently suggested that each mode of being requires its own “specific” primitive and irreducible quantificational apparatus. Suppose, for example, that the modes of being are existence and subsistence. Then McDaniel’s position implies that we must recognize two independent specific quantifiers, the “existential quantifier” and the “subsistential quantifier” (each with its specific dual, its associated “version” of the universal quantifier). These two quantifiers are not to be thought of as restricted versions of the “generic” ‘∃’ of the logic texts; ‘∃’ is rather to be regarded as a “derived” abstraction, a “mere disjunction” of the existential and subsistential quantifiers. But McDaniel’s position must somehow come to terms with the fact that quantifiers of both sorts may occur in the same statement and a fortiori in the same argument. (Consider an argument whose premises and conclusion involve quantification over both mathematicians—who exist—and mathematical problems—which subsist.) This paper explores the following question: What rules of inference govern the formal validity of such “mixed” arguments? Various answers to this question are considered, none of which seems to be satisfactory. It is suggested that the absence of a satisfactory solution to this “problem of mixed inferences” casts doubt on the idea of modes of being.
Lecture 2: Dispensing with Ontological Levels
14 June 2013, 15:00, Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon, Room 5.2
Abstract: Dispensing with Ontological Levels: An Illustration. The following concepts are very closely related and perhaps even interdefinable: “ontological level”; “ontologically more/less fundamental than”; “ontologically grounded in”; “ontological status.” Have these concepts a place in metaphysics? It is suggested in this paper that there is a Bad Way to approach this question and a Good Way. The Bad Way is to propose examples of things to which these concepts are alleged to apply. (E.g., the unit set of Socrates is on a lower ontological level than, is ontologically less fundamental than, is ontologically grounded in, and does not enjoy the special ontological status of, Socrates.) The Good Way is to consider both well-worked-out metaphysical systems that make use of these concepts and well-worked-out systems that do not, and (assuming that there are systems of both sorts) to ask whether, in general, the better systems employ these concepts or the better systems eschew them. Before any such comparative evaluation can be carried out, however, we must have the competing systems on the table. This paper is intended only to accomplish one part of that preliminary undertaking—to put one metaphysical system on to the table and to formulate it in a way that brings the fact that there is no place in it for the concept “ontological level” (etc.) into sharp focus.

Living at the Present Moment - Fabrice Correia (Un. Neuchâtel)

SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
2012-13: Session 13

Living at the Present Moment
Fabrice Correia (University of Neuchâtel)

31 de Maio de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: The growing block theory and the moving spotlight theory - two of the main theories of temporal existence which take temporal passage seriously - have recently been accused of leading to a grave epistemic issue: on either view, we cannot know that it's now now. The objection is considered by some prominent philosophers to be very powerful. I offer a precise characterisation of these views (and, in so doing, of other related views in the area like e.g. presentism), and use it to undermine the objection. The presentation is largely based on joint work with Sven Rosenkranz.

ALL WELCOME!

Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL

Vida, Metafísica e Sociedade - I. Jornada Portuguesa sobre Georg Simmel

Vida, metafísica e sociedade: I Jornada Portuguesa sobre Georg Simmel é uma iniciativa do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa e conta com a participação de especialistas portugueses com estudos publicados sobre a multifacetada produção de um dos mais influentes pensadores do século XX. 
- Paisagem e Sentimento Vital em Simmel, de Paulo Roberto,
- A experiência estético-metafísica de Os Alpes, de Teresa Dugos,
- Demarcações transgressivas no pensamento de G. Simmel, de Teresa Sousa Fernandes,
- Condição humana e individualidade: da possibilidade de uma antropologia em Georg Simmel, de Adriana Veríssimo Serrão,
- In Memoriam Maria João Costa Pereira, por João Paulo da Cruz Mendes,
- Os Pobres: Um Ensaio de Sociologia Cínica, de Rafael Marques
- A metodologia do dinheiro, de Francisco Felizol Marques,
- Simmel e a Arte do Retrato, de Artur Ramos,
- Simmel e a Cultura Feminina em Natália Correia, de José Luís Garcia

31 de Maio
Anfiteatro III
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa

Fiora Salis: Fictionally Creating Fictional Characters

SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

2012-13: Session 9

Fictionally Creating Fictional Characters

Fiora Salis (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon)

19 de Abril de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Upholders of fictional creationism claim that fictional characters are abstract entities created by the author of fiction through the activity of story telling. They recognize that story telling involves pretense and imagination, yet they claim that by pretending to refer to a fictional individual the author genuinely brings something into existence. I distinguish two kinds of creation, genuine creation and fictional creation. Genuine creation is the process of causing something to exist or bringing something into existence. Fictional creation (I claim) is the author’s origination, performed in story telling, of a practice of thinking and talking about the same thing, even though there is not such a thing. I argue that upholders of fictional creationism have not been able to offer any adequate account of the genuine creation of fictional characters. Alternatively, I offer an account of the fictional creation of fictional characters coherent with fictional irrealism.

Génesis del Tiempo en las Edades del Mundo (1813) de F.W.J. Schelling

Clique no cartaz para ler a informação em melhores condições.
As sessões na Universidade de Lisboa decorrem no Anfiteatro III da Faculdade de Letras da mesma Universidade (FLUL).

Logic is Metaphysics

SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

2012-13: Session 5

Logic is Metaphysics

Daniel Durante (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte e LanCog, Universidade de Lisboa)

1 de Março de 2013, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)

Abstract: Analyzing the position of two philosophers whose views are recognizably divergent, W. O. Quine and M. Dummett, we intend to support a striking point of agreement between them: the idea that our logical principles constitute our principles about what there is, and therefore, that logic is metaphysics.


ENTRADA LIVRE


Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
LanCog Group (Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group)
http://www.lancog.com/
Project Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
Instituto Filosófico de Pedro Hispano, Departamento de Filosofia da UL

International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality

International Workshop on the Epistemology of Modality
University of Lisbon, Faculty of Letters
29-31 August 2013

http://www.epistemologyofmodality.weebly.com

Van Inwagen once wrote (in his influential paper ‘Modal epistemology’
from 1998) that “modal epistemology is a subject about which little is
known”. Today, the discipline has flourished. A lot has been written
since then and research on the topic continues to be the focus of a
large community of philosophers. We certainly know more today about
the topic than we did in 1998, but it would be daring to say that our
epistemic situation is much better. The discipline has witnessed a
Rationalist Renaissance and is now witnessing what might end up being
an anti-rationalist turn.

This workshop aims to provide a forum for discussion and to reflect,
via the contributed talks and informal discussions, the state of art
of the discipline.

Invited Speakers:
David Chalmers (Australian National University; New York University)
Bob Hale (University of Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at
Aberdeen; King’s College London)
Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling)
Daniele Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila)
Anand Vaidya (San José State University)

Organizers:
João Branquinho (LanCog Group, University of Lisbon) and Sonia
Roca-Royes (University of Stirling).


Call for Abstracts

We invite submissions of long abstracts (1000-2000 words) on any
aspect in the epistemology of modality. The time slot is 90 minutes
distributed thus: 50’ talk + 40’ discussion.
For refereeing purposes, abstracts should contain a clear statement of
the thesis that will be defended in the talk as well as of the
argumentative strategy. They should be prepared for blind-refereeing.
We aim at accepting 5 abstracts.

Submission Procedure: Please send your abstract to
EpistemologyModalityLisbon@gmail.com as an attachment (.pdf
preferred).
The subject of the e-mail should contain the word ‘submission’.
The body of the email should include your name, affiliation, abstract
title, and the email address you want us to use to communicate with
you.
Deadline for submissions: 28th February 2013.
Notification of acceptance/non-acceptance: 28th May 2013.

Scientific Committee:
João Branquinho (Universidade de Lisboa); David Chalmers (Australian
National University; New York University); Bob Hale (University of
Sheffield; Northern Institute of Philosophy at Aberdeen; King’s
College London); Sonia Roca-Royes (University of Stirling); Daniele
Sgaravatti (Università dell'Aquila); and Anand Vaidya (San José State
University).

Registration:
There are no registration fees, but registration will be required.
Details on how to register will follow in due course, before
registration opens on the 1st of June 2013.

Sponsors of the Workshop:
LanCog - Research Group in Language, Mind and Cognition
FCT Project - Online Companion PTDC/FIL-FIL/121209/2010
FCT - Fundação para Ciência e Tecnologia, Ministério da Educação e Ciência
CFUL - Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa
FLUL - Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa
QREN - Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional

Metaphysical Knowledge

SEMINAR SERIES IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

2012-13: Session 1

Metaphysical Knowledge

E.J. Lowe (Durham University)

26 October 2012, 15:00

Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa
Sala Mattos Romão (departamento de Filosofia)


Abstract: My topic in this paper is metaphysical knowledge, by which I
mean knowledge of metaphysical truths. And my principal questions are
whether, and if so how, such knowledge is attainable by creatures like
ourselves. I shall argue that we can and do possess metaphysical
knowledge. But, of course, how controversial this claim is deemed to
be will depend on what one takes to be distinctive of metaphysical
truths. Consequently, I must first offer some account of what I take
to be the nature of metaphysics as an intellectual discipline. It will
soon be seen that on my account of the nature of metaphysics, the
claim that we can and do possess metaphysical knowledge is indeed a
controversial one and consequently one whose defence may prove
interesting. But in offering this account and defending this claim, I
have a deeper motive. This is to promote a certain conception of the
methodology of metaphysics which is regrettably still very much in
abeyance, largely on account of the dominance of first epistemology
and then the philosophy of language in the western philosophical
tradition of the last three hundred years. The slogan for my preferred
conception of metaphysical method might well be this: metaphysics must
be done directly. What I am opposing is the view — so widespread that
it often goes unspoken — that metaphysics, to the extent that it can
be done at all, has to be done through the medium of some other branch
of philosophy, such as epistemology, logic, philosophical semantics or
the philosophy of mind. What is particularly absurd about this view is
that each of these branches of philosophy has, inevitably, certain
distinctively metaphysical commitments which cannot possibly be
warranted by doing metaphysics in the way that the view recommends.
All that sustains the view in the face of this absurdity, as far as I
can see, is the unspoken conviction of so many philosophers that
metaphysics cannot be done, as I put it, ‘directly’. I think we owe
this pernicious conviction in large measure to the ‘modernist’ legacy
of Descartes, Hume, and Kant — great philosophers all of them, but all
philosophers whose work contributed to the demotion of metaphysics
from its central role in philosophy. It has been encouraging to see
evidence of a revival in the fortunes of metaphysics in recent years,
but contemporary metaphysics is still a tender plant that needs much
nurturing and one that is constantly in danger of reverting to the
degenerate type propagated by the modernist legacy.

Free Attendance

Sponsored by: Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de
Letras da Universidade de Lisboa

Paolo Crivelli: Truth in Metaphysics E4

Clique no cartaz para ler a informação em boas condições.

Timothy Williamson: Logic, Science, and Metaphysics

PETRUS HISPANUS LECTURES 2012

TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON
Wykeham Professor of Logic
University of Oxford

LOGIC, SCIENCE, AND METAPHYSICS

5 and 6 June 2012, 11:00
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Room: Anfiteatro 4

Lecture 1: Logics as Scientific Theories
The similarities between logic and other branches of science are
usually underestimated. Like other scientific theories, logics can be
compared and assessed abductively in terms of their simplicity,
strength, elegance, and consistency with what is already known.
Tarski’s definition of logical truth provides a suitable standard of
correctness for them to aim at. Such an account can avoid the
objectionable features of Quine’s holism.

Lecture 2: Modal Logic as Metaphysics
The second lecture is a case study of the methodology described in the
first, applied to modal logic with a metaphysical interpretation of
the modal operators. Some consequences will be drawn out for possible
worlds model theory and the question of whether there could have been
things that do not actually exist. The relevance of higher-order modal
logic for these issues will also be explained.

The Petrus Hispanus Lectures are delivered every other academic year
at the University of Lisbon by a leading figure in current research
about the nature of mind, cognition and language. Previous Petrus
Hispanus Lecturers: Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Richard Jeffrey,
Ned Block, David Kaplan, Tyler Burge.

Markus Gabriel - Reconsiderando a natureza da falácia naturalista

Clique na imagem para a ver em boas condições.

Markus Gabriel (Universidade de Bona)

"Reconsiderando a natureza da falácia naturalista"

Conferência em Português.

15 de Abril - 15h

Anfiteatro III

Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa

Plural Quantification and Modality

Clique na imagem para ler a informação em boas condições.
Conferência de Gabriel Uzquiano da Universidade de Oxford: "Plural Quantification and Modality" (25 de Fevereiro, 16h).

Identity is a modally inflexible relation: if objects are identical, then they are necessarily identical. The necessity of identity is generally supported by the combination of Leibniz's law of indiscernibility of identicals and the premise that every object is necessarily self-identical. How special is identity in this respect? Do any other relations have a comparable claim to modal inflexibility? In particular, we will look at the relation one object bears to some objects iff it is "one of" them. Is it the case that if one object is one of them, then it is necessarily one of them? What could be the justification for this claim?

Abismo e Nada absoluto

No próximo dia 15 de Abril, pelas 17h, Antonio Cardiello, investigador do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, dará uma prelecção subordinada ao tema, "Abismo e Nada absoluto: confluências budistas no pensamento de Fernando Pessoa e Nishida Kitarō" (Anfiteatro IV da FLUL).

A Filosofia e as suas Questões II - Colóquio

FACULDADE DE LETRAS DA UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA
7 / 8 de Janeiro de 2010
Sala 5.2 - ENTRADA LIVRE

PROGRAMA:

7/Janeiro

   9h | Abertura

  Moderador: Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos
Metafísica

9h15 | Joana Luís, A filosofia russa como precursora do vitalismo: reflexão em torno do conceito de integralidade
10h   | Lavínia Pereira, A duração bergsoniana: experiência e significação


Ética /Bioética

11h     | Manuel João Pires, Se pudéssemos, viveríamos a nossa vida outra vez? Princípios de uma Ética Trágica
11h 45 | Margarida Abenta Roque, O Testamento Vital


  Moderador: Carlos João Correia
Política

14h 30 | Francisco Felizol, A Liberdade na Filosofia do Dinheiro de Georg Simmel
15h 15 | Gonçalo Zagalo, As noções de Justiça em Derrida e Deleuze
16h | Nuno Castanheira, Hannah Arendt: liberdade e política
16h 45 | José Luis Pérez, Albert Camus ou o retrato do artista enquanto homem
17h 30 | Bruno Peixe Dias, Situação e Acontecimento: pode a revolução ser pensada?


  8 /Janeiro

  Moderadora: Maria Luísa Ribeiro Ferreira
Filosofia da Arte

9h30   | Catarina Coelho, O Denkraum em Aby Warburg: o Intermedio warburguiano
10h15  | Ana Mantero, Paul Klee, a linha que desenha a Natureza
11h     | Teresa Quirino, Catástrofe e Viagem em Vieira da Silva
11h 45 | Ana Cravo, Da beleza do drama


  Moderador: José Quaresma
Estética

14h30  | Dirk Hennrich, Elementos para uma Paisagem Europeia
15h 15 | Ana Rita Ferreira, O carácter dual da experiência estética
16h      | Ana Nolasco, O conceito de Kinismo de Peter Sloterdijk e a subversão do ideal clássico do Belo

Organização: Adriana Veríssimo Serrão/Seminário de Investigação dos cursos de pós-graduação em Filosofia (FLUL)

Conferência de João Branquinho

A QUESTÃO DE DEUS
HISTÓRIA E CRÍTICA
Projecto de Filosofia FCT / CFUL [PTDC/FIL/64249/2006]
Informação disponível em: www.aquestaodedeus.blogspot.com

IXº Seminário
30 de Outubro de 2009
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa
Instituto Pedro Hispano
Sala 5.2
14.00 – 16.00

JOÃO BRANQUINHO (UL)
A Existência não é um Predicado de Ordem Superior

Resumo: A minha tese negativa é a de que a concepção de Frege e Russell do predicado de existência como um predicado de ordem superior está profundamente errada e deve ser abandonada (mesmo relativamente a afirmações gerais de existência, por exemplo "Mamíferos voadores existem"). A minha tese positiva é a de que, no contexto do discurso de primeira ordem, o predicado de existência pode e deve ser invariavelmente visto como um predicado de primeira ordem e a existência como uma propriedade de indivíduos (pace Kant, Hume, Frege, Russell e outros). Todavia, partilho duas suposições importantes com a tradição associada a Frege e Russell: (a) Não há objectos não existentes; (b) O conceito relevante de existência é melhor capturado pelo quantificador existencial da habitual lógica de predicados.

Conferência coincidente com o Seminário de Filosofia Analítica

Debate

Maria Leonor Xavier
Apresentação e Moderação
Estado da Arte do Projecto

Entrada Livre

Sergio Sorrentino: o conceito filosófico de pessoa

Universidade de Salerno

Sergio Sorrentino da Universidade de Salerno (Università di Salerno) dará duas lições, assim como uma conferência subordinada ao tema: "La parabole de la notion de personne dans la pensée occidentale"
Lições:
1 de Junho – Sala 8.1 - 20-22 horas
3 de Junho – Pavilhão Novo – Sala 12 – 14-16 horas

Conferência: "La parabole de la notion de personne dans la pensée occidentale"
5 de Junho – Sala 5.2 – 11 horas

Organização de Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos/CFUL

Stephen Mumford em Letras

Stephen Mumford, Professor da Universidade de Nottingham, fará uma conferência no Seminário de Filosofia Analítica (sessão nº4), no próximo dia 8 de Maio, às 16h, na Sala Mattos Romão da FLUL. O tema da intervenção será o seguinte: "Modelling Causes as Vectors"

"Abstract: Causal transactions are standardly modelled in neuron diagrams, which are presented as a philosophically neutral way of representing what happens when one thing causes another. It is argued in this paper that neuron diagrams are a theory-laden representation of causation and that the commitments contained are questionable. Instead, a vector model of causation is introduced and developed that shows better the complexity that can be involved in causation. Among other things, the model will allow us to see a solution to the problem of causation by absence."

Entrada livre.

Seminário sobre Kit Fine

Realiza-se amanhã (13 de Fevereiro, pelas 16h) na Sala Mattos Romão (Departamento de Filosofia da FLUL), um Seminário sobre o ensaio de Kit Fine, Professor da NYU (New York University), "Essence and Modality".
Este Seminário é da iniciativa do LangCog, área de investigação do CFUL.